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Unlike economies as a whole, manufacturing industries exhibit unconditional convergence in labor
productivity.  The paper documents this finding for 4-digit manufacturing sectors for a large group
of developed and developing countries over the period since 1990.  The coefficient of unconditional
convergence is estimated quite precisely and is large, at 3.0-5.6 percent per year depending on the
estimation horizon.  The result is robust to a large number of specification tests, and statistically highly
significant. Because of data coverage, these findings should be as viewed as applying to the organized,
formal parts of manufacturing.
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Neoclassical growth theory establishes a presumption that countries with access to 
identical technologies should converge to a common income level.  Countries that are poorer and 
have higher marginal productivity of capital should therefore grow faster in the transition to the 
long-run steady state.  However, empirical work has not been very kind to this proposition.  
There is no tendency for poor countries to grow faster than rich ones, over any reasonably long 
time horizon for which we have data (see Figure 1).
1  Whatever convergence one can find is 
conditional: it depends on policies, institutions, and other country-specific circumstances. The 
only exceptions to the rule seem to be states/regions within a unified economy such as the United 
States (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991).
2 
If growth rates are characterized by conditional instead of unconditional convergence, 
economies will tend towards different levels of income in the long-run.  Lack of empirical 
support for (unconditional) convergence has led theory in the direction of models with 
endogenous technological change, which don’t necessarily exhibit convergence, and to empirical 
work that focuses on identifying the conditioning variables that makes convergence feasible (see 
Acemoglu [2009] on theory and Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple [2005] on empirical work). 
In contrast to this large literature, I show in this paper that unconditional convergence 
does exist, but that it occurs in the modern parts of the economy rather than the economy as a 
whole.  In particular, I document a highly robust tendency towards convergence in labor 
productivity in manufacturing activities, regardless of geographic location and country-level 
                                                           
1 There exist shorter periods of time over which convergence has been observed.  The decade before the global 
financial crisis of 2008-2009 is one such period (see Subramanian 2011, chap. 4, and Rodrik 2011).   
 
2 Some studies also find unconditional convergence among the richer OECD countries, but it is difficult to know 
what to make of this result in light of the obvious sample-selection bias (Baumol 1986; DeLong 1988). -2- 
 
 
influences.  The coefficient of unconditional convergence is estimated quite precisely and is 
large, at 3.0-5.6 percent per year depending on the estimation horizon.  These estimates imply 
that industries that are, say, a quarter of the way to the technology frontier will experience labor 
productivity growth at a rate of 4.1-7.8 percentage points per annum.  I note that my data come 
from UNIDO’s industrial statistics data base, which is derived largely from industrial surveys.  
Since microenterprises and informal firms are often excluded from such surveys, my results on 
unconditional convergence should be as viewed as applying to the organized, formal parts of 
manufacturing.   
The central result of this paper is illustrated in Figure 2.  The scatter plot shows the 
partial relationship between the growth of labor productivity and its initial level controlling for a 
number of fixed effects.  Each dot on the scatter plot represents a 4-digit industry in a specific 
country. (Illustrative industries: macaroni, noodles & similar products, pesticides and other agro-
chemical products, agricultural and forestry machinery.)  The two panels depict growth rates 
over a decade (left-hand side) and five years (right-hand side), respectively. Each country is 
represented over a single time horizon, with the most recent ten- or five-year period since 1990 
for which it has data.  Industry, decade, and industry × decade dummies are included in the 
regressions used to generate both plots.  
Since these plots do not control for country-level determinants, they represent a test of 
unconditional convergence. (The need for period and industry fixed effects will be motivated 
subsequently.)  The negative and highly significant slope is unmistakable, illustrating the central 
conclusion of this paper: manufacturing exhibits a strong tendency for unconditional 
convergence.  Industries that start at lower levels of labor productivity experience more rapid 
growth in labor productivity.  As I will show below, when controls for country-specific -3- 
 
 
determinant such as policies or institutions are included convergence is even more rapid.  But 
what is striking in Figure 2 is the evident strength of convergence in the data even in the absence 
of such controls.
3   
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to demonstrate unconditional convergence in 
industry for a wide range of countries and for detailed manufacturing industries.  There does not 
seem to be any work that has looked at highly disaggregated data for manufacturing or at the 
manufacturing experience of countries beyond OECD and U.S. states (Bernard and Jones, 1996a 
and 1996b; see also Sørensen 2001).  However, one related study deserves mention.  In 
unpublished work, Hwang (2007, chap. 3) has documented that there is a tendency for 
unconditional convergence in export unit values in highly disaggregated product lines.  Once a 
country begins to export something, it travels up the value chain in that product regardless of 
domestic policies or institutions.
4  Hwang shows that the lower the average unit values of a 
country’s manufactured exports, the faster the country’s subsequent growth, unconditionally. 
This paper differs from Hwang in that it focuses on output rather than exports, and directly on 
productivity (rather than unit values).  Convergence seems to kick in manufacturing regardless of 
whether production is exported.
5     
  Unconditional convergence seems to characterize the vast majority of the (formal) 
manufacturing industries included in my data.  But the estimated convergence coefficient is not 
uniform.  Convergence appears to be least rapid in textiles and clothing and most rapid in 
                                                           
3 It should be clear that my focus in this paper is on what it is typically called “beta-convergence,” not “sigma-
convergence.”  Even if beta-convergence holds, countries may fail to converge in real data as long as random shocks 
to the growth process are large and act in offsetting manner.   
 
4 Hwang demonstrates his result for both 10-digit U.S. HS import statistics and 4-digit SITC world trade statistics.  
The first classification contains thousands of separate product lines.     
 
5 Also related is a paper by Levchenko and Zhang (2011) which estimates model-based relative productivity trends 
for 19 manufacturing industries from the 1960s through the 2000 and show that there has been steady convergence 
across countries.   -4- 
 
 
machinery and equipment, with transport equipment and iron, steel and metal products 
somewhere in between. So there is a hierarchy within manufacturing that accords well with 
intuition.  Even within manufacturing some of the “escalators” move up more quickly than 
others.   
Another result is that the coefficient of convergence appears to be non-linear.  The further 
away from the frontier an industry, the greater its rate of convergence (the larger the beta-
coefficient).  The plots in Figure 2 give a hint of this non-linearity.   
I also discuss in the paper how to reconcile unconditional convergence in manufacturing 
with its absence for economies as a whole.  I use a simple decomposition to identify the factors 
that weaken the forces of convergence as we aggregate up from individual manufacturing 
industries.  The exercise highlights the role of structural factors, in particular the slow (and 
sometimes perverse) movement of resources across economic activities with different 
convergence characteristics.        
The trouble from a convergence standpoint is that economic activities that are good at 
absorbing advanced technologies are not necessarily also good at absorbing labor.  As a result, 
too large a fraction of an economy’s resources can get stuck in the “wrong” sectors – those that 
are not on the escalator up.  When firms that are part of international production networks or 
otherwise benefit from globalization employ little labor, the gains remain limited.  Even worse, 
inter-sectoral labor flows can be perverse with the consequence that convergence within the 
“advanced” sectors is accompanied by divergence on the part of the economy as a whole.  I 
illustrate these outcomes using the experience of specific countries.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes the data and methods used for the 
estimation.  Section III presents the basic results and various robustness checks.  Section IV -5- 
 
 
considers the conditions under which convergence may fail to aggregate up to the level of the 
entire economy.  Section V provides concluding remarks.   
 
II.  Data and methods 
A.  Date source and description.  I use data from UNIDO’s  INDSTAT 4 data base, which 
provides industrial statistics for a wide range of countries at the ISIC 4-digit level (UNIDO 
2011).  These statistics cover value added and employment, among others, for up to 127 
manufacturing industries per country, allowing me to calculate labor productivity (value added 
per employee) and its growth at the same level of disaggregation.
6  The data are fairly complete 
for recent years but become more spotty the further back one goes.  As a practical matter, it is 
impossible to calculate growth rates for periods that extend before 1990, so I take that year as the 
starting point for the empirical work.   
With 1990 as the starting point, we cannot look for convergence over long periods of 
time.  In what follows, I restrict attention to growth over two types of time horizons: 10-years 
and 5-years. The regressions that follow in turn take two forms.  They are either pure cross-
sections for a particular time period, say 1995-2005 or 2002-2007.  Or they are pooled 
regressions where I combine the latest 10- or 5-year period (since 1990) for each country with 
data.  The advantage of the pooled approach is that it maximizes the number of countries that can 
be included.  This yields 40 countries in the case of the 10-year regressions, and 72 in the case of 
the 5-year regressions.  The pooled regressions constitute my baseline specification. 
                                                           
6 Some countries use ISIC combination classifications that cover 2-3 ISIC categories.  For consistency, 
duplicate entries under an ISIC combination code were dropped.  Also, there are numerous instances of 
negative and zero values for value added and employment, which were also removed from the data set.   -6- 
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, UNIDO’s data come from industrial surveys whose 
coverage differs across countries. Data for developed countries refer for the most part to “all 
establishments.” But in developing countries enterprises with fewer than 5 or 10 employees are 
typically not included.  For this reason, the convergence results below should be read as applying 
to the more formal, organized parts of manufacturing and not to micro-enterprises or informal 
firms.  The appendix provides a summary of data coverage for each country included in the 
regressions.  
An important problem with the data is that INDSTAT4 provides figures for value added 
in nominal U.S. dollars.  What we need is a measure of growth in labor productivity in real 
terms.  However, on the assumption that 4-digit manufacturing industries in different countries 
experience a common inflation rate (in U.S. dollars), possibly up to a random error term, we can 
still exploit the variation within industries across countries to estimate the convergence 
parameter we need.  In what follows, I explain my approach in greater detail. 
B.  Empirical specification.  Dividing nominal value added by employment we calculate 
nominal labor productivity at the 4-digit level, ￿￿￿￿, where i denotes the industry, j the country 
and t the time period.  The rate of growth of labor productivity in real terms,￿￿ ￿￿￿￿, is given in turn 
by ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿, where ￿￿￿￿ is the increase in the industry-level deflator and a hat over a 
variable denotes percent changes.   
  We assume (real) labor productivity growth in each industry is a function both of 
country-specific conditions and of the convergence potential.  The latter in turn is proportional to 
the gap with each industry’s own frontier technology, represented by ￿￿￿
￿.  Hence: 
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , -7- 
 
 
where ￿ ￿ is a dummy variable that stands in for all time- and industry-invariant country-specific 
factors.  The convergence coefficient we are interested in estimating is ￿.  Note that if ￿￿￿￿￿￿ is 
measured with error, this specification potentially introduces a bias towards over-estimating the 
rate of convergence, since such an error weakens the link between initial productivity and final 
productivity.  This is a common problem in the empirical literature on convergence (Temple 
1998).    
The last step is to assume a common global (U.S. dollar) inflation rate for each individual 
industry, ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿, up to an idiosyncratic (random) error term. This is a reasonable 
assumption since all the industries in question are manufactures and tradable, facing common 
world prices.  Domestic prices may diverge from world prices due to transport costs, import 
tariffs or export subsidies, but such wedges introduce differences in levels, not growth rates.  
Equivalently, we can simply assume that dollar inflation rates are not systematically correlated 
with an industry’s distance from the technological frontier.  This allows us to express the growth 
of nominal labor productivity as follows: 
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ln ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿. 
We assume ￿￿￿￿ is uncorrelated with other explanatory variables and captures all other 
idiosyncratic influences on measured labor productivity.  Re-arranging terms, we now have our 
final estimating equation: 
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ln￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿, 
This can be expressed equivalently as  
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿, 
where ￿￿￿ stands for ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ln￿￿￿
￿￿.  Hence we can regress the growth of labor productivity in 
U.S. dollar terms on the initial level of labor productivity, a set of industry × time period fixed -8- 
 
 
effects (￿￿￿) and country fixed effects (￿ ￿).   In the specifications below, I will include separate 
industry and period dummies as well for completeness.     
It is also possible to run this regression over a single time period, as a pure cross-section.  
In this case, the industry × time period fixed effects are reduced to industry fixed effects: 
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ 
As specified, our estimate of ￿ will be a measure of conditional convergence, since 
country-specific conditions are explicitly controlled for by the country fixed effects.  A test of 
unconditional convergence consists of dropping these country dummies and checking whether 
the estimated coefficient ￿￿ remains negative and statistically significant.  
 
III. Empirical results 
A.  Basic results.  Tables 1 and 2 show results for the 10- and 5-year growth regressions, 
respectively.  The dependent variables in each case are the (compound annual) growth rates of 
labor productivity for 4-digit manufacturing industries.  The regressors are the log of initial labor 
productivity and a host of fixed effects, depending on the specification.  The regressions for each 
time period are run first without and then with country dummies.  As explained previously, these 
two specifications yield the unconditional and conditional convergence coefficients, respectively.  
The tables display results for the pooled sample first, followed by cross-sections covering 
specific time periods.  (The first columns of the pooled specifications correspond to the scatter 
plots displayed in Figure 2).  Standard errors are clustered at the country level in all 
specifications.   
  The estimated unconditional convergence coefficient is highly significant in almost all 
specifications.  The only exceptions are the two earliest samples, which cover very few countries -9- 
 
 
(1991-2001 with 12 countries and 1990-2000 with 7 countries).  The coefficient estimate ranges 
from -1.6 percent (1992-2002) to -9.0 percent (2002-2007).  The estimates from the baseline 
(pooled) specifications are -3.0 and -5.6 percent, for the 10- and 5-year regressions respectively. 
The more recent samples generally tend to yield higher estimates, as do the 5-year 
regressions (compared to the 10-year specifications).  Since the country coverage varies across 
these different time periods and specifications, it is not possible to directly compare these results 
or ascertain why they differ.  However, the convergence coefficient is generally higher (in 
absolute value) when the sample contains a larger number of lower-income economies (as the 
larger and more recent samples tend to do).  This seems to be related to a non-linearity in 
income, as I will show below.         
   Each specification in Tables 1 and 2 is paired with its conditional variant, including 
country fixed effects.  The estimated convergence coefficients always increase in size, typically 
doubling when country dummies are included.  This is as expected in view of the conditional 
convergence results in the literature.  Country-specific conditions obviously play a role in 
determining the speed of catch-up.  What is surprising is how systematic and apparently rapid 
productivity convergence in individual manufacturing industries is even when country-specific 
conditions are not taken into account.    
Since the data I work with are post-1990, one question is whether there is something 
special about this more recent period.  It could be that globalization and the spread of global 
production networks now greatly facilitate technological dissemination and therefore catch-up.    
We cannot rule out the possibility that manufacturing industries were not subject to 
unconditional convergence in earlier periods.  But what we can rule out is that aggregate 
productivity also exhibits unconditional convergence since 1990. As Figure 3 shows, economy--10- 
 
 
wide labor productivity (GDP per worker) shows no tendency towards convergence during the 
time period under analysis.  This is true for the most comprehensive sample of countries, as well 
as for the samples where the country coverage is restricted to the countries included in my 
industry regressions (both the 10-year and 5-year regressions, separately).    
B.  Robustness.  Table 3 presents a number of additional robustness tests.  I take the pooled 
specification from Table 1 as my baseline and re-run the same specification with the following 
changes: (i) using a 3-digit disaggregation for manufacturing industries (instead of 4-digit); (ii) 
re-calculating growth rates by estimating a log-linear trend using all 10 annual observations 
instead of end-points only;
7 (iii) excluding observations that correspond to the highest and lowest 
10 percent values for growth; (iv) excluding countries that enter with fewer than 40 industries; 
(v) excluding observations in the top and bottom, respectively, of the sample in terms of labor 
productivity; (vi) excluding former socialist countries (whose unusual experience during the 
1990s may need special care in interpretation) from the sample; (vii) running weighted 
regressions with (log) value added as weights.   
Encouragingly, the estimated convergence coefficient remains statistically highly 
significant in all these variants.  Note in particular that the estimated coefficient remains 
unchanged when we weight industries by size.
8  Hence the convergence result is not driven by 
the experience of relatively small industries.  The main changes of note in Table 3 are the 
following.  First, when the top and bottom 10% of growth observations are removed from the 
sample, the point estimate of the convergence coefficient is reduced to -1.3 percent (column 4), 
but remains highly significant.  Second, the convergence coefficient for the bottom half of the 
                                                           
7 This guards against introducing a spurious bias that may arise from lagged labor productivity appearing directly on 
both sides of the regression equation, with opposite signs. 
 
8 Using employment weights produces nearly identical results. -11- 
 
 
labor-productivity sample is decidedly larger than that for the top half (columns 6 and 7), 
indicating once again a degree of non-linearity. 
Another type of robustness check is to scrutinize the convergence experience on an 
industry-by-industry basis. This would be the direct analogue of running cross-country growth 
regressions, where we regress, separately for each industry, the growth rate of an industry’s labor 
productivity against its initial level across all countries in the sample that have the requisite data:   
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿β￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿   for i = 1, …, I. 
This entails running as many regressions as we have manufacturing industries.  Pooling is no 
longer appropriate since now we cannot control for industry-specific inflation trends through 
industry×period dummies.  Taking the 2000-2005 period to maximize the number of countries 
(and hence observations), we are able to run 127 individual industry convergence regressions.  
Most of these regressions cover 30-40 countries, so we should not be too demanding in terms of 
statistical significance for industry-specific estimates.   
  Figure 4 summarizes the results by showing the distribution of estimated convergence 
coefficients across the 127 industries.  The vast majority of the estimates are negative, and most 
lie between 0 and -10 percent.  While not all these coefficient estimates are statistically 
significant, a surprising number of the negative ones are.  Specifically, 76 (out of 127) of the 
industry regressions yield negative and statistically significant convergence coefficients (at the 
95% level or higher).  By contrast, none of the (few) positive coefficients are statistically 
significant.  Figure 5 presents scatter plots for four specific industries to give a visual sense of 
the results.       
  One possible concern in interpreting these results is that my assumption of a common 
value added deflator (in dollars) for each 4-digit industry, regardless of the country in which it is -12- 
 
 
located, may be introducing a bias to the estimation.  I justified this assumption previously by 
arguing that the manufacturing industries in question are tradable, and hence face common world 
prices.  Domestic trade and subsidy policies may well drive a wedge between domestic and 
world prices.  But as long as these wedges do not change over time in a systematic fashion –
enabling domestic prices to experience greater inflation in the industries that are the furthest 
away from the technological frontier – my results should remain unbiased.   
A different kind of potential complication arises from systematic changes in real 
exchange rates.  In principle, across-the-board increases in domestic costs such as wages should 
be offset, on average, by depreciation of the home currency, leaving dollar values generally 
unchanged.  But in countries that experience sustained movements in their real exchange rate, 
trends in value added expressed in U.S. dollars will be misleading with regard to productivity in 
individual manufacturing industries.  The worst case, from the perspective of the present paper, 
would be if the low-income countries which house a preponderant share of low-productivity 
industries were the ones to experience real exchange rate appreciations – a rise in domestic costs 
not compensated by currency depreciation. This would lead to an upward bias in our 
convergence estimates.    
  To check against this possibility, Table 4 provides some additional robustness tests 
dealing with real exchange rates.  I follow two strategies to check for the possibility of the kind 
of bias identified above.  First, I divide the countries into four quartiles, ranked by the percent 
change in their real exchange rate over the relevant period.
9  I run the baseline specification 
separately for each quartile to see if there are appreciable differences in the estimated speed of 
                                                           
9 These are conventional bilateral real exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S.  Domestic inflation rates have been 
calculated using producer-price indices where possible, substituting the CPI where PPI is not available. The source 
for the data on exchange rates and price indices is the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  A few countries had 
to be dropped because of lack of price data.  -13- 
 
 
convergence across quartiles.  Second, I rescale the growth in value added per worker by 
deflating these numbers with (one plus) the rate of appreciation of the country’s real exchange 
rate.  I rerun the baseline specification using these adjusted values for the dependent variable.  
The results shown in Table 4 are comforting.  There is some evidence for the 5-year 
sample that systematic changes in the real exchange rate may have imparted an upward bias to 
the convergence estimates for that sample.  But the rescaled estimate is reduced only marginally 
(from 0.056 to 0.050), and the estimated convergence coefficient remains highly significant even 
in the group of countries that have experienced the greatest appreciation.  The 10-year sample, 
by contrast, shows little difference across quartiles or between the baseline and rescaled 
estimates.  In all, there is little evidence that real exchange rate movements have distorted our 
basic findings.                  
  Another source of possible bias arises from compositional changes.  Even 4-digit 
industries are a mix of different activities, and what appears as an increase in dollar values may 
be in reality a shift towards higher value-added activities within the same industry (Schott 2004; 
Hwang 2007).  It is possible that industries that start further away from the frontier experience 
such shifts more rapidly.  From the present perspective, however, this is of lesser concern.  To 
the extent that such product upgrading takes place generally, it is another manifestation of the 
productive convergence we are interested in tracking.  
  Finally, I note that I have re-estimated convergence using growth rates for gross output 
per employee, rather than for value added per employee.  Output per employee may not capture 
productivity trends accurately when the share of intermediate inputs changes.  But since output 
prices may diverge from value-added deflators and are more closely linked to world market -14- 
 
 
prices, this serves as an additional robustness check. These results (not shown) are very similar 
to those reported above and remain highly significant.  
C.  Further results.  I have already mentioned that the estimated convergence coefficient 
seems to exhibit non-linearity.  This issue is analyzed more systematically in Table 5.  The first 
two columns add the square of productivity to the baseline specification.  The quadratic term 
enters with a positive coefficient that is highly significant.  The remaining two columns check for 
non-linearity by estimating separate convergence coefficients for industries separated into 
quartiles according to their labor productivity.  Industries that are further away from the frontier 
have larger convergence coefficients.  The bottom line is that the rate of convergence is higher in 
the least productive manufacturing industries. 
Next I check whether there are appreciable differences across industries in the speed of 
convergence.  I have grouped 4-digit industries into larger sub-groups, such as textiles and 
clothing, chemicals, and transport equipment.  I find that estimated convergence coefficient is 
negative and significant for each of these sub-groups.  However, there are significant differences 
in the magnitudes of the coefficients, shown in Table 6, that seem interesting.  (The table shows 
a pared down specification which includes interaction terms with just a few of the sub-groups.)  
We note that food, beverages, and tobacco and textiles and clothing have the lowest convergence 
coefficients (in absolute value).  These activities tend to be technologically the least sophisticated 
ones.  Put differently, these are activities where the convergence gap in poor countries is 
relatively modest.  On the other hand, the most rapid convergence seems to take place in the 




IV.  Why unconditional convergence may not aggregate up 
  The forces of convergence seem quite strong in manufacturing industries.  It stands to 
reason that we would uncover similar results for certain other parts of the economy as well, 
perhaps modern, tradable services such as financial or business services among others.   We 
might expect convergence at the sectoral level to produce aggregate convergence as well, 
especially if converging sectors also attract more resources and become larger over time.  Yet the 
aggregate data do not support this conjecture as we have seen.  In this section I consider why 
economies as a whole may fail to exhibit unconditional converge despite the pull of convergence 
within manufacturing industries.    
We shall analyze the conditions under which convergence aggregates up.   We begin by 
expressing aggregate value added per worker in country j, ￿￿, as a weighted average of labor 
productivity in each industry: 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, 
where the weights ￿￿￿ are the employment share of each industry.  Depending on the nature of 
the exercise, this aggregate may refer to manufacturing as a whole (in which case it would be 
MVA per worker) or to the entire economy (GDP per worker).  Differentiating this expression 
totally and dividing through by ￿￿ we get the proportional growth rate of aggregate productivity: 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿, 
where ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿  is the productivity of each industry relative to the average.  The first term 
here represents the appropriately weighted average of productivity growth across individual 
industries, while the second term captures the productivity effects of labor re-allocation across 
industries. The second term is positive (negative) insofar as relatively more productive sectors 
increase (decrease) their employment share.  -16- 
 
 
  Let the set of industries characterized by unconditional convergence be denoted by C.  
Productivity in these industries evolves according to the following equation: 
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿!"￿  for # $ %￿ 
Note that we allow for differences in convergence behavior across industries (and have dropped 
the time subscripts).  Productivity growth in the non-convergence industries – such as traditional 
agriculture or informal activities, denoted by NC – is given by &￿￿ for # $ '%￿   
Combining this information with the preceding equation and re-arranging yields: 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿￿￿￿￿
￿$)







￿￿￿&￿￿￿      (9) production structure effect
￿( ￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿      (:) re-allocation effect
 
 This equation expresses growth in aggregate labor productivity as the sum of four effects.  The 
first term captures the direct influence of convergence industries.  Since ￿￿ ; <, countries that 
are poorer in the sense of having low levels of (appropriately averaged) productivity in 
convergence industries will tend grow more rapidly, everything else the same.  The other three 
terms, however, can possibly confound this effect in practice.  These terms capture the effect of 
economic structure and its change over time.   
First, even within convergence industries, poor economies may specialize (have high 
￿￿￿￿￿in those activities where convergence is less rapid and/or the productivity frontier not too far 
away (term 2).  Second, poorer countries may have a greater propensity to specialize in non-
convergence industries (term 3).  And third, resources in poorer countries may move over time in -17- 
 
 
the “wrong direction” – to industries with low relative productivity (low ￿￿￿) (term 4).  In all 
these cases, the forces of convergence will be blunted, and may fail entirely.  If structural 
differences across rich and poor countries are sufficiently pronounced in the ways just described, 
it is possible for aggregate data to show no convergence, despite positive convergence in 
individual industries.  The key here is that sectoral employment shares may vary systematically 
with incomes so as to eliminate overall convergence possibilities. 
I illustrate the quantitative significance of these structural features with two exercises, 
one for manufacturing and one for the economy as a whole. For the first exercise, I compute the 
magnitudes of terms 1 and 2 in the above decomposition for each of the countries in my 40-
country sample, using actual values in the dataset.  I set ￿￿ equal to 1.5 percent for textiles and 
clothing, 3.8 percent for machinery and equipment, and 3.1 percent for the rest of manufacturing.  
I set the values of ￿￿
￿ to the highest level of labor productivity observed in the data. The values of 
￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿ are also calculated from the raw data for each country.  The values for terms 1 and 2 
that we thus obtain for each country are plotted in Figure 6 against average manufacturing 
productivity.  
The “pure convergence” effect (term 1) is, as predicted, a negatively sloped relationship, 
indicating that poorer economies get a bigger growth kick out of it.  What is of interest in Figure 
6 is that what I have called the “distance to frontier” effect (term 2) is positively sloped and 
hence acts in an offsetting manner.  In fact, the correlation coefficient between terms 1 and 2 
across countries is very high (-0.85).  What this indicates is that the forces of convergence across 
countries are blunted, even within manufacturing, by prevailing patterns of specialization.  
Poorer countries have proportionately more labor in manufacturing industries with low rates of 
convergence or with technological frontiers that are less distant.   -18- 
 
 
These within-manufacturing effects are often aggravated by broad inter-sectoral shifts.  
McMillan and Rodrik (2011) show that perverse structural shifts have played a large role in 
recent decades in depressing productivity growth in Africa and Latin America.    My second 
exercise, taken directly from McMillan and Rodrik (2011), illustrates the importance of term 4 in 
the decomposition above.   
Figure 7 displays a particularly egregious instance of perverse structural change in 
Argentina. Between 1990 and 2005, manufacturing industries in Argentina lost more than 6 
percentage points in terms of employment share.  Most of this de-industrialization took place 
during the 1990s, under the Argentine experiment with hyper-openness.  Even though the decline 
in manufacturing was halted and partially reversed following the devaluation and recovery from 
the financial crisis of 2001-2002, this was not enough to change the overall picture for the period 
1990-2005.  The sector experiencing the largest employment gain over this period was 
community, personal, and government services, which has a high level of informality and is 
among the least productive in the economy.  Hence when we plot the employment gains of 
individual sectors against their relative productivity we get a sharply negative slope (Figure 7).  
Computing the aggregate effects as indicated by term 4, we reach the results that perverse 
structural change has reduced Argentina’s labor productivity growth by 0.6 percentage points per 
annum, a quarter of the economy’s actual productivity growth over this period. 
 
V.  Concluding remarks 
  I have provided evidence in this paper that unconditional convergence is alive and well.  
But one needs to look for it among manufacturing industries rather than entire economies.  It is 
perhaps not surprising that manufacturing industries should exhibit unconditional convergence, -19- 
 
 
and if the estimates here are to be believed, at quite a rapid pace too.  These industries produce 
tradable goods and can be rapidly integrated into global production networks, facilitating 
technology transfer and absorption.  Even when they produce just for the home market, they 
operate under competitive threat from efficient suppliers from abroad, requiring that they 
upgrade their operations and remain efficient.  Traditional agriculture, many non-tradable 
services, and especially informal economic activities do not share these characteristics.        
The findings in this paper offer new insight on the determinants of economic growth and 
convergence across countries.  They suggest that lack of convergence is due not so much to 
economy-wide misgovernance or endogenous technological change, but to specific 
circumstances that influence the speed of structural reallocation from non-convergence to 
convergence activities.  The policies that matter are those that bear directly on this reallocation.  
As discussed in Rodrik (2011), what high-growth countries typically have in common is their 
ability to deploy policies that compensate for the market and government failures that block 
growth-enhancing structural transformation. Countries that manage to affect the requisite 
structural change grow rapidly while those that fail don’t. 
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Figure 1:  Relationship between growth (vertical axis) and initial income over different time horizons.  
Source:  Author’s computations from Maddison (2010). 
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Figure 2:  Unconditional convergence in 4-digit industries 
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Figure 3:  Unconditional convergence at the country level, 1990-2007 






























































































IRL DNK FIN MAC GBR











































7 8 9 10 11 12

































































7 8 9 10 11





























































































7 8 9 10 11




Figure 4: Kernel density estimate of convergence coefficients across 4-digit industries, 2000-2005 
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Figure 5:  Convergence in four manufacturing industries 
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Figure 6: Relationship between “pure convergence” and “distance to frontier” effects at different levels of 
aggregate productivity 
















































































Figure 7: Perverse structural change in Argentina 
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.
 
 
A
s
t
e
r
i
s
k
s
 
d
e
n
o
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
:
 
*
*
*
 
p
 
<
 
.
0
1
,
*
*
 
p
 
<
 
.
0
5
,
*
 
p
 
<
 
.
1
.
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A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
T
a
b
l
e
:
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
5
-
y
e
a
r
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
d
a
t
a
 
s
e
t
 
a
n
d
 
d
a
t
a
 
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
I
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
1
0
-
y
r
 
d
a
t
a
 
s
e
t
 
a
l
s
o
?
 
D
a
t
a
 
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
A
l
b
a
n
i
a
 
 
 
E
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
v
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
l
y
 
e
n
u
m
e
r
a
t
e
d
;
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
f
i
v
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
d
.
 
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
 
 
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
1
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
A
u
s
t
r
a
l
i
a
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
a
i
d
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
A
z
e
r
b
a
i
j
a
n
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
B
o
l
i
v
i
a
 
 
 
 
E
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
5
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
.
 
B
o
t
s
w
a
n
a
 
 
 
L
i
c
e
n
s
e
d
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
n
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
a
i
d
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
B
r
a
z
i
l
 
x
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
u
n
i
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
v
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
.
 
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
C
h
i
l
e
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
 
 
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
1
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
.
 
C
y
p
r
u
s
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
l
y
 
o
w
n
e
d
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
x
 
N
o
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
.
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D
e
n
m
a
r
k
 
x
 
T
h
e
 
f
i
g
u
r
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
w
a
g
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
a
l
a
r
i
e
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
d
e
r
i
v
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
-
b
a
s
e
d
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
 
A
l
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
n
y
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
i
n
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
a
r
e
 
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
.
 
E
c
u
a
d
o
r
 
x
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
1
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
.
 
E
r
i
t
r
e
a
 
x
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
1
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
E
t
h
i
o
p
i
a
 
x
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
1
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
.
 
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
G
e
o
r
g
i
a
 
 
 
N
o
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
.
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
 
 
 
E
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
1
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
 
x
 
E
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
n
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
I
n
d
i
a
 
 
 
F
a
c
t
o
r
i
e
s
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
p
o
w
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
i
n
g
 
1
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
o
n
 
a
n
y
 
d
a
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
l
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
p
o
w
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
i
n
g
 
2
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
 
F
o
u
r
 
p
r
o
v
i
n
c
e
s
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
a
r
e
:
 
A
r
u
n
a
c
h
a
l
 
P
r
a
d
e
s
h
,
 
L
a
k
s
h
a
d
w
e
e
p
,
 
M
i
z
o
r
a
m
 
a
n
d
 
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
 
 
 
L
a
r
g
e
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
(
w
i
t
h
 
1
0
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
)
 
a
n
d
 
m
e
d
i
u
m
 
s
c
a
l
e
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
(
w
i
t
h
 
2
0
 
t
o
 
9
9
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
)
.
 
I
r
a
n
 
(
I
s
l
a
m
i
c
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
o
f
)
 
x
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
1
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
.
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
 
x
 
E
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
.
 
I
s
r
a
e
l
 
x
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
n
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
a
m
o
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
.
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
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J
a
p
a
n
 
x
 
C
e
n
s
u
s
 
c
o
v
e
r
s
 
a
l
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
e
d
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
,
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
b
e
l
o
n
g
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
o
n
l
y
 
i
n
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
s
t
 
d
i
g
i
t
 
i
s
 
0
,
 
3
,
 
5
 
o
r
 
8
.
 
I
n
 
a
l
l
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
y
e
a
r
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
i
s
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
o
u
r
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
J
o
r
d
a
n
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
L
a
t
v
i
a
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
.
 
M
a
c
a
o
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
M
a
d
a
g
a
s
c
a
r
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
M
a
l
t
a
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
M
e
x
i
c
o
 
 
 
N
o
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
.
 
M
o
n
g
o
l
i
a
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
M
o
r
o
c
c
o
 
 
 
E
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
1
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
o
r
 
a
 
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
 
o
f
 
m
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
 
d
i
r
h
a
m
s
 
p
e
r
 
y
e
a
r
.
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
N
e
w
 
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
 
 
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
a
i
d
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
N
o
r
w
a
y
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
O
m
a
n
 
x
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
1
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
P
a
l
e
s
t
i
n
i
a
n
 
T
e
r
r
i
t
o
r
y
 
x
 
N
o
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
.
 
P
a
n
a
m
a
 
 
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
v
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
P
e
r
u
 
 
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
v
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
.
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P
o
l
a
n
d
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
Q
a
t
a
r
 
 
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
1
0
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
.
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
o
f
 
K
o
r
e
a
 
x
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
v
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
o
f
 
M
o
l
d
o
v
a
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
s
e
l
f
-
s
u
s
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
D
a
t
a
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
 
t
h
e
 
a
r
e
a
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
f
t
 
b
a
n
k
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
D
n
i
e
s
t
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
w
n
 
o
f
 
B
e
n
d
e
r
.
 
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
R
u
s
s
i
a
n
 
F
e
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
S
i
n
g
a
p
o
r
e
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
S
p
a
i
n
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
u
n
i
t
s
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
i
n
g
 
o
n
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
.
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
 
x
 
T
h
e
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
c
o
v
e
r
s
 
a
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
.
 
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
i
a
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
T
r
i
n
i
d
a
d
 
a
n
d
 
T
o
b
a
g
o
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
T
u
r
k
e
y
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
U
g
a
n
d
a
 
 
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
l
y
 
o
w
n
e
d
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
l
y
.
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
 
x
 
A
l
l
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
 
 
A
l
l
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
.
 
U
r
u
g
u
a
y
 
 
 
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
v
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
.
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Y
e
m
e
n
 
 
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
l
y
 
o
w
n
e
d
 
u
n
i
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
n
e
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
 
C
o
m
p
i
l
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
U
N
I
D
O
 
(
2
0
1
1
)
 
 